



 This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in South East Asia Research on 21 
Aug 2019, available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/0967828X.2019.1642027  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/31505/  
 
A research agenda for studying legislative incumbent turnover in new democracies, 
using Indonesia as a case study 
Michael Buehler 








Legislative incumbent turnover rates are an important indicator for the quality of a 
democracy. Low turnover rates may indicate the presence of oligarchic structures while 
high turnover rates may be a sign of political instability. Yet, there is little research on 
incumbent turnover in new democracies. This article will suggest ways to address this 
gap in the literature by looking at Indonesia. The country is not only the third largest 
democracy in the world but also a relatively new democracy that has only conducted 
four elections since 1998. 
The lack of studies on incumbent turnover in new democracies is mirrored in the 
literature on Indonesia. The vast scholarship on democratization in Indonesia that has 
emerged over the past twenty years has yet to harness the insights to be gained from 
examining legislative incumbent turnover rates. The goal of this article is twofold: One, 
to present for the first time a systematic and comprehensive account of incumbent 
turnover rates in Indonesia across all election cycles since 1998. Two, to sketch an 
agenda for future research on incumbent turnover in Indonesia and other new 
democracies and facilitate such research by making publicly available an original 
dataset on incumbent turnover in Indonesia.1  
Key words: Democratization, Elections, Incumbent turnover, Indonesia, New Democracies, 
Political Elites 
------------------------------------------------ 
Incumbent turnover rates have been called an important “seismograph” for the quality of 
democracy (Best et al. 2000, 185). A “normal” turnover rate lies between 20% and 40%. 
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Turnover rates below 20% “mark a limit below which oligarchic structures can develop.” 
Turnover rates above 90% are associated with “regime discontinuity with complete or near 
complete changes of the political order” (Gouglas et al. 2018, 3). In short, “the question of 
parliamentary turnover feeds into the wider concern of elite turnover” (Abel and Grossman 
2015, 458). 
Incumbent turnover rates not only illuminate the contours of democratization but also 
shed light on more specific questions related to the quality of democracy, including the role 
political parties play in elite turnover (Hazan and Rahat 2006) and how turnover rates shape 
the policymaking process (Kuklys 2013). 
In light of the usefulness of knowing turnover rates for our understanding of 
democratization, it is surprising that no systematic account of turnover rates in Indonesia, the 
world’s third largest democracy after India and the United States, exists. To some degree, this 
simply reflects the fact that research on incumbent turnover in new democracies is almost 
non-existent. Most research on incumbent turnover focuses on the USA (see Moncrief et al. 
2004 for an overview). There is also a small literature on incumbent turnover in Western 
Europe (see Gouglas et al. 2018 for an overview).  
 In addition to this bias in the broader literature towards incumbent turnover in the 
USA and, to some degree, Western Europe, a systematic and comprehensive account of 
incumbent turnover in Indonesia may also be missing due to the difficulties of collecting 
data. The only study on it in Indonesia was published after the Indonesian National Election 
Commission published online data on candidates running in the 2014 legislative elections. In 
its concluding section, the study lamented a “lack of systematic data” on incumbent turnover 
rates in Indonesia as a detriment to further research (Dettman et al. 2017, 28).  
To address this gap in the literature and to facilitate future research in Indonesia and 
other new democracies, we will first provide comprehensive data on incumbent turnover for 
Indonesia’s elections since 1999. We will then identify patterns in these descriptive statistics 
and discuss how they can be used as stepping stones towards more in-depth research.  
 
A lack of incumbent turnover studies 
Twenty years after the collapse of the New Order regime, incumbent turnover in Indonesia’s 
legislative elections remains grossly under-researched. Occasionally, turnover rates are 
mentioned in the literature (Mietzner 2009, 144) but without any critical discussion of how 
they were measured and how these results were obtained. These accounts are therefore 
merely anecdotal. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one systematic study of 
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incumbent turnover in Indonesia. However, it examines turnover only for the Indonesian 
national parliamentary elections in 2014 because it relies on an online dataset made available 
by the National Election Commission that year (Dettman et al. 2017). In short, our article 
provides the first systematic account of incumbency turnover over multiple election cycles in 
Indonesia. 
In the following paragraphs, we explain how we defined and measured incumbent 
turnover. We then identify patterns in turnover rates before discussing how our findings can 
be used for future research. 
 
Definition of turnover, levels of measurement, and data collection 
How turnover is defined and at what level it is measured determines research results (Abel 
and Grossman 2015, 458). Hence, we first explain how we defined incumbent turnover.  
 
Defining incumbent turnover 
Any new parliament consists of re-elected and incoming legislators. The latter group is a mix 
of parliamentarians who have never sat in parliament before, so-called first-timers, and 
parliamentarians who did not occupy a seat in the previous parliament but may have been a 
member of parliament (MP) at some other point in the past.  
We do not differentiate between first-timers and MPs who occupied a seat in 
parliament before the previous legislative period. Instead, we simply report incoming 
legislators because this is the standard approach in the scholarly literature on incumbent 
turnover (Abel and Grossman 2015, 458). This will make our findings directly comparable to 
the broader literature, which defines incumbent turnover “as the proportion of newcomers, 
including both first-time and re-entering MPs, as a share of the total membership of a new 
legislative assembly” (Gouglas et al 2018, 4).  
However, one needs to be aware of the potential bias the conflation of newcomers and 
re-entering MPs introduces to measuring incumbent turnover rates. A legislator who sat in the 
national parliament between 1999 and 2004, then acted as governor between 2004 and 2014, 
but re-entered national parliament in 2014, is theoretically not a “new candidate.”2 This is 
particularly relevant for research in new democracies such as Indonesia. In many new 
democracies the state continues to dominate the economy and corruption and rent-seeking are 
endemic and systemic. In such contexts, proximity to the state is crucial to personal 
advancement and enrichment. Hence, any political post is better than no political post. This 
environment leads to very specific career patterns. Concretely, Indonesian politicians 
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frequently rotate between national and subnational parliaments and also between executive 
and legislative branches of government because they need to stay “inside” the state at all 
cost.3 The number of re-entering MPs may therefore be higher in new democracies such as 
Indonesia than in consolidated Western democracies. 
Focusing on incoming candidates only, and in line with other existing literature on 
turnover rates, we therefore measured, strictly speaking, “the effects of political alternation 
rather than the renewal of the legislature” (Abel and Grossman 2015, 459).4 It is thus more 
accurate to speak of elite circulation than elite turnover. In any case, focusing on incoming 
candidates only does not affect the validity of turnover rates between consecutive election 
cycles, which is the main point of comparison throughout the article. 
 
Measuring incumbent turnover 
The level of analysis at which turnover rates are reported also influences research findings. 
Turnover rates can be reported for individual candidates, political parties or entire 
parliaments. Examining turnover rates at the individual level would not have allowed us to 
identify broader patterns in elite circulation but would merely have led to a study on career 
strategies of individual politicians (King 1991). Similarly, reporting turnover rates at the 
parliamentary level would have led to a loss of important information. For example, Party A 
and Party B may have had incumbent turnover rates of 30% and 10% respectively in the 2004 
elections but Party A and Party B then had incumbent turnover rates of 10% and 30% in the 
2009 elections. While the overall turnover rate measured at the parliament level remains the 
same, important changes have occurred at the party level. In light of these considerations, 
reporting turnover rates at the party level seemed most appropriate for our interest in elite 
circulation in Indonesia. 
There are additional hurdles to studying legislative incumbent turnover in new 
democracies. Politics in Indonesia and other new democracies is largely non-programmatic. 
Political parties, in other words, rarely represent distinct political ideologies. In addition, 
party systems are usually poorly institutionalized (Hicken 2006). A lack of ideological 
platforms and resources explain why a higher number of candidates switch parties from one 
election cycle to another compared to established democracies in the West (O’Brien and 
Shomer 2013). 
Since party switching is less common in consolidated democracies, it is rarely 
discussed in the literature on incumbent turnover, and various experts advised us not to count 
party switchers as turnover points.5 To be in line with standard practice with existing 
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research, we treated incumbents who switched parties before elections just as any other 
incumbent. At the end of this article, we will discuss what high levels of party switching may 
mean for incumbent turnover rates. 
 
Data collection 
Electoral incumbent turnover data may be collected by comparing the names of 
parliamentarians at the end of a given legislative session with the names of parliamentarians 
at the beginning of the next legislative session. However, such an approach would miss seats 
that have been turned over through mid-session exits. To avoid such bias we relied on 
Moncrief’s method, which obtains turnover rates by comparing “the membership at the 
beginning of the session immediately after election t with the membership immediately after 
the election at t + 1” (Moncrief et al. 2004, 361). In line with this method, we calculated 
incumbent turnover based on the official lists of MPs that the Indonesian National Election 
Commission publishes after each election. Many of these lists were available only in 
hardcopy or pdf format. Hence, we entered all list data into an excel sheet, and, as we did so, 
corrected misspellings and made note if the same candidate name was spelled differently 
across lists and/ or elections. Since many Indonesians do not use family names, we consulted 
various sources to triangulate data on the identity of candidates and MPs from as many 
vantage points as possible. We compared handbooks about MPs published by the Indonesian 
national parliament, the Kompas newspaper archive, which compiles the curricula vitae of 
MPs and many candidates, and data from the Secretariat General office of the national 
parliament. As a last resort, we examined newspaper articles to verify candidates’ identity. 
We have made our dataset set available for future research in an online appendix. [link here 
to supplementary material] 
Having verified the identity of candidates and MPs, we calculated both non-electoral 
and electoral incumbent turnover. To establish non-electoral turnover rates, that is, the 
number of MPs dropping out before the elections, we compared the names of all MPs in a 
given parliament with all the candidate names on party lists submitted to the National 
Election Commission for the subsequent election. For example, we compared the names of 
all MPs in the 1999–2004 parliament with the names of candidates running in the 2004 
elections. To determine electoral turnover rates, we compared the lists of MPs published by 
the Indonesian National Election Commission after each election. For example, we compared 
the lists of MPs elected in 1999 with the list of MPs elected in 2004 to calculate how many 
MPs in the 2004–2009 parliament were newcomers. It is important to mention that there is a 
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short time lag between the elections and the publication of these official MP lists. The MP list 
resulting from the 7 June 1999 election was published on 1 September 1999. The MP list 
resulting from the 5 June 2004 election does not state a publication date. The MP list 
resulting from the 9 April 2009 election was published on 2 September 2009. The MP list 
resulting from the 9 April 2014 election was published on 9 May 2014.6 Theoretically, 
elected members of parliament could have exited politics before they were registered in the 
membership lists. The time lag between elections and the publication date of our data sources 
may therefore lead to an underrepresentation of turnover rates. However, we believe that this 
risk of underreporting incumbent turnover is minuscule as the time lag between elections and 
the publication of these official MP lists consists of a few months at most. 
 
Findings 
An overview of non-electoral and electoral incumbent turnover rates in Indonesia’s national 
legislative elections since 2004 is shown in Table 1. 
 
 [4.1] Non-electoral incumbent turnover 
Non-electoral incumbent turnover has steadily declined since the 1999 elections. 40.5% 
(187/462), 36.5% (201/550) and 16.6% (93/560) of MPs did not make it back on candidate 
lists for the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections respectively. 
Non-electoral incumbent turnover also dropped sharply when compared within parties 
across election years. Most extreme in this respect is the PKB. While 52.9% (27/51) of PKB 
incumbents from the 1999–2004 parliament were no longer running in the 2004 elections, 
only 7.1% (2/ 28) of all PKB incumbents from the 2009–2014 parliament disappeared from 
PKB’s list prior to the 2014 elections. 
Comparing non-electoral incumbent turnover across parties within a given election 
year is problematic as some parties, especially before the consolidation7 of the party system 
in the mid-2000s, had only very few MPs. Their non-electoral turnover figures therefore look 
very high compared to larger parties with more MPs. However, a comparison of the six 
parties that have consistently had MPs in the national assembly since 1999 shows that the 
PPP has one of the highest non-electoral turnover rates prior to each election. Meanwhile, the 
PKS is the only party that has consistently had one of the lowest non-electoral turnover rates 
since 2004, as shown in Table 1.  
 
[4.2] Electoral incumbent turnover  
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Our findings show that since 2004 electoral incumbent turnover has been fairly stable at high 
levels. 49.4% (136/ 268), 56.2% (196/ 349) and 49.7% (232/ 467) of all MPs who ran for re-
election failed to win a seat in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections respectively.8  
 We also wanted to know whether incumbents were defeated by candidates from their 
own party or from other parties. On average, 26.6% (291/1091) of all incumbents standing 
for re-election between 1999 and 2014 were defeated by candidates from their own party. 
25% (270/1084) of all incumbents standing for re-election between 1999 and 2014 lost their 
seat to a candidate from another party. However, incumbent turnover through partisan defeat 
increased steadily over the years. 22.2% (61/ 275), 24.4% (85/ 349) and 27.2% (127/ 467) of 
incumbents were defeated by candidates from other parties in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 
elections respectively. Meanwhile, 27.3% (75/ 275), 31.8% (111/ 349) and 22.5% (105/ 467) 
of all incumbents who were running for re-election were defeated by co-partisans in 2004, 
2009 and 2014 respectively, as shown in Table 1. 
In short, partisan defeat has replaced intrapartisan defeat as the main reason for 
electoral incumbent turnover.  
 
Situating our findings in the broader literature and identifying avenues for future 
research 
In the remaining paragraphs, we want to link the incumbent turnover patterns identified 
above with existing research on the causes of turnover. This will allow us to identify 
promising avenues for future research into the causes of incumbent turnover in Indonesia in 
particular and other new democracies in general. We are currently conducting field research 
in Indonesia on some of these issues and will report our findings in a separate paper.  
 Supply-and-demand models of incumbent turnover (Norris 1997; Best et al. 2000; 
Gouglas et al. 2018, 4) provide an ideal starting point to develop a research agenda that will 
examine in a systematic fashion the causes of incumbent turnover in Indonesia and other new 
democracies. Such models categorize the causes for incumbent turnover as follows. On the 
one hand (supply-side), incumbents drop out of politics because they die; because they are 
forced to step down due to arrest or a scandal; or because they leave politics voluntarily. On 
the other hand (demand-side), a seat may turn over because an incumbent fails to secure a 
nomination from her party prior to elections, a process called “deselection” (Matland and 
Studlar 2004, 94); or because she fails to get re-elected by voters, as shown in Figure 1.  
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5. 1 Supply-side causes of incumbent turnover 
Assuming that death in office and arrests of incumbents are too rare to account for more than 
a fraction of non-electoral incumbent turnover, the decline we identified in Table 1 may 
indicate a growing attractiveness of being an MP. Therefore, fewer incumbents dropped out 
voluntarily before the elections in 2014 than in 2009 and 2004. Factors that motivate 
incumbents to seek re-election are financial compensation for being an MP, perks that come 
with career continuity and prospects for material advancement (through legal and illegal 
means) (Borchert 2011; Gouglas et al. 2018, 6). There are also characteristics of legislative 
institutions that may influence incumbent turnover rates prior to elections (Heinsohn and 
Freitag 2012, 359). For instance, legislative institutionalization shapes non-electoral 
incumbent turnover (Matland and Studlar 2004). Concretely, the more support lawmakers 
receive from a well-funded parliamentary infrastructure, the less likely they are to resign due 
to exhaustion or frustration. Furthermore, studies also mention the productivity and 
effectiveness of parliaments as determinants of turnover rates. Incumbents find it more 
appealing to remain in a parliament that is pursuing its agenda effectively and which is 
capable of defending its interests vis-à-vis other government branches. In contrast, weak 
parliaments that are overpowered by other branches of government see higher turnover rates 
because some incumbents quit out of frustration over their relative lack of power (Heinsohn 
and Freitag 2012, 360). Finally, in countries where double-listings are allowed, turnover rates 
tend to be lower because incumbents reduce their risk of deselection and electoral defeat by 
running in more than one constituency (Matland and Studlar 2004, 105).  
In light of these findings, future research on non-electoral incumbent turnover in 
Indonesia will have to examine if, and if so, how, financial compensation motivates 
incumbents to seek re-election. Compared to democracies in the West, informal 
compensation is likely to influence the supply of incumbents too, given the fact that 
corruption and rent-seeking remain endemic and systemic in Indonesian politics. At the same 
time, a more assertive government stance against corruption may deter incumbents from 
seeking re-election,9 or lead to higher arrest numbers and subsequent drop-out or de-
selection.10  
Furthermore, future research will have to examine to what degree the aforementioned 
institutional determinants of non-electoral turnover apply to Indonesia. For instance, 
candidates can only run in one district. Hence, double-listings cannot explain variance in pre-
election incumbent turnover rates across time. With regard to parliamentary capacity, the 
Indonesian national parliament has become more assertive over the years vis-à-vis other 
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government branches (Sherlock 2007, 4). Incumbents in Indonesia are therefore unlikely to 
forego re-election because they are frustrated by a lack of power. Likewise, state support for 
parliamentarians has improved considerably in recent years11 even though the 
institutionalization of the Indonesian national parliament continues to be below par (Adiputri 
2015).  
In any case, even if one were to assume that working as a legislator in Indonesia’s 
national parliament is challenging because of executive government dominance in Indonesian 
politics and low levels of institutional support, we do not believe that these challenges are 
serious enough to account for a significant number of incumbents to voluntarily leave politics 
prior to elections. Based on the fact that the Indonesian legislature issues only a very low 
number of laws each year, scholars have suggested that the Indonesian parliament is 
primarily a place where rent-seekers meet to discuss potential deals (Ziegenhain 2008a, 45). 
In such an environment, monetary rewards associated with a seat in the national parliament 
arguably trump concerns about institutional support available to parliamentarians or 
parliamentary power vis-à-vis other government branches when Indonesian legislators 
consider whether or not to run again for a seat in parliament.  
Future research needs to examine how Indonesia’s multi-layered political system and 
its poorly institutionalized party system shape incumbent turnover. As mentioned above, our 
dataset of incumbent curricula vitae suggests that Indonesian politicians frequently move 
between government layers throughout their careers. Future research on the supply-side 
causes of incumbent turnover in Indonesia will therefore also have to look at if, and if so 
how, the presence of subnational elections (and therefore additional political marketplaces 
that provide national level MPs with an exit option) shape MPs decision to seek or abstain 
from re-election. In other words, do some incumbents refrain from running in national 
elections because they see a higher chance of winning elections at the local level? Likewise, 
future research should examine how many former MPs re-enter national politics from a 
subnational post in an election year.  
Finally, future research needs to examine the number of MPs that switch parties prior to 
elections and whether this is a viable strategy to get re-elected. As mentioned in the 
introduction, new democracies such as Indonesia have higher numbers of MPs switching 
parties than consolidated democracies in the West. Whether high numbers of party switchers 
increase incumbent turnover rates and what it means for the quality of a democracy needs to 
be examined in future studies. A preliminary analysis we conducted on the electoral fate of 
party switchers indicates that most failed to get re-elected, as shown in Table 2.  
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Whether most party switchers fail to get re-elected because these incumbents did not 
receive any support from their new parties or whether voters punished them for switching 
parties requires further examination. The broader relevance of our findings regarding party 
switching incumbents in Indonesia doing poorly at the ballot box is that party switching may 
increase incumbent turnover rates in new democracies. In fact, an expert on incumbent 
turnover in Western democracies we consulted suggested that party switching of incumbents 
is likely to become more prevalent in consolidated democracies too, given the rise of 
populism and the accompanying erosion of traditional party alliances.12 Future research on 
incumbent turnover will therefore have to pay more attention to the potential implications 
party switching may have on incumbent turnover rates and elite circulation more broadly. 
 
[5.2] Demand-side causes of incumbent turnover 
There are also demand-side causes for incumbent turnover, as mentioned in Figure 1. 
Concretely, candidate de-selection by party leaders and voters withdrawing their support for 
incumbents on Election Day shape both non-electoral and electoral turnover. In Indonesia, 
the picture is complicated by the fact that the electoral system has changed considerably over 
the past twenty years, with potential consequences for candidate de-selection and voter 
behaviour.  
In the following paragraphs we will therefore briefly examine the main changes to the 
electoral system since 1999, before looking at how de-selection and voter behaviour has 
shaped incumbent turnover over past election cycles. 
Changes in the electoral system since 1999 
In the 1999 elections, citizens could only vote for a party. Party leaders then selected MPs 
from a list of nominees from the electoral district in which the party had achieved its best 
results.13 After the 1999 elections, civil society organizations and foreign donor agencies 
criticized Indonesia’s electoral framework for favouring candidates who had strong relations 
with party leaders but lacked genuine grassroots support, thereby perpetuating the dominance 
of “old elites” over Indonesia’s centralized political party structures.  
In an effort to deepen democratization, the government replaced Legislative Election 
Law No 3/1999 with Legislative Election Law No 12/2003 prior to the 2004 parliamentary 
elections. Now, voters had to choose a party and were given the possibility of picking a 
candidate from that party. In other words, the party vote was mandatory while the preference 
vote was optional. A candidate was elected regardless of her ranking on the party list if she 
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surpassed 100% of a divisor, which was calculated by dividing the total number of votes in 
an electoral district by the total number of seats available in that district (Hare-quota).  
In March 2008, the legislature adopted Legislative Election Law No 10/2008. Once 
again, the intention was to curb the authority of party leaders and empower ordinary citizens 
in the 2009 elections. Unlike in 2004, voters could only tick one box in 2009, either for a 
party or for a candidate. If they voted for a candidate, this vote would automatically also be 
counted as a vote for the party that had nominated that candidate.14 In addition, the law stated 
that seats were to be allocated based on the proportion of total party votes and preference 
votes won in each district. In other words, the National Election Commission would 
determine who would occupy the seats won by each party based on the preference votes each 
candidate from these parties had received.  
In December 2008, only five months before the legislative elections, the 
Constitutional Court intervened in a way that dramatically reshaped the electoral system. 
Specifically, the Constitutional Court annulled the 30% divisor stipulated in Law No 10/2008 
and mandated that seat allocation take place solely based on preference vote tally, regardless 
of ballot rank. Parties would still submit ordered lists of candidates to voters and the number 
of total preference and party votes would still determine how many legislative seats the party 
would occupy. However, only the number of votes a candidate received would determine if 
she were to secure a legislative seat. The Constitutional Court decision therefore created an 
open party list system. This completed the shift under way since 1999 from a highly party-
centred election system to a highly candidate-centred election system.  
Legislative Election Law No 28/ 2012 was adopted in April 2012 to regulate the 2014 
elections. The new law did not contain any significant changes and preserved the open party 
list system introduced in 2009. Concretely, Indonesian citizens were again asked to either 
vote for a party or select their preferred candidate from a list, which then counted as a vote 
for that candidate as well as her party. As in 2009, the Electoral Commission then calculated 
the number of seats each party had won in each electoral district. These seats where then 
allocated to candidates based on the number of preference votes (Nehru and Bulkin 2013). 
[5.2.i] Incumbent turnover through candidate de-selection  
An important determinant of incumbent turnover is de-selection by an incumbent’s party, as 
shown in in Figure 1. In many democracies, more incumbents are de-selected by their parties 
than voted out of office by the electorate (Gouglas et al. 2018).  
Unfortunately, the data sources we relied on – official lists of members of parliament 
published by the National Election Commission – did not allow us to identify whether the 
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369 incumbents who exited politics prior to elections between 2004 and 2014 did so 
voluntarily or against their will. Since our data shows how many incumbents dropped out 
prior to elections, without providing any further information why they left politics (death; 
arrest/ scandal; de-selection), future research will first have to establish what percentage of 
non-electoral incumbent turnover occurs due to de-selection. This requires a shift from 
examining incumbent turnover at the party level to the level of candidates. Personal 
interviews, focus groups and surveys among incumbents and party leaders responsible for 
candidate selection will have to be conducted. In a second step, future research will have to 
examine if, and if so, why incumbent turnover due to de-selection has decreased over the 
years in contrast to incumbent turnover rates due to deselection of candidates in consolidated 
democracies. 
Since death in office and forced resignations during sessions are relatively rare in 
Indonesia15, we assume that most involuntary exits prior to elections occur because parties 
refuse to re-nominate incumbents. The decline in non-electoral incumbent turnover because 
of de-selection in past years may be interpreted in two different ways: One, political parties 
have become more consolidated over the years. Party leaders are content with most of their 
MPs and therefore feel less need to purge incumbents from their party lists prior to elections. 
Declining non-electoral turnover rates may therefore indicate a strengthening of party 
leadership. Two, the decline in non-electoral incumbent turnover rates could, however, also 
mean that party leaders were no longer able to deselect incumbents in 2014 to the same 
degree they were in 2004 because incumbents have found ways to influence the candidate 
selection process in their favour. Declining non-electoral incumbent turnover rates may 
indicate, in fact, a weakening of party leaderships.  
In short, we need to gain a better understanding of why non-electoral turnover has 
decreased dramatically in Indonesia over the years. Is this a sign for the institutionalization of 
Indonesian political parties? Have party leaders managed to streamline party apparatuses and 
establish a pool of loyal and electable MPs that make pre-election purges unnecessary? 
Alternatively, is the decline of non-electoral incumbent turnover indicating that a class of 
professional MPs has emerged that has managed to co-opt their party leaders?  
The decline in non-electoral incumbent turnover may also have been caused by 
aforementioned changes in the electoral system. Open-list electoral systems, for instance, 
may increase the risk for party leaders to de-select incumbents because citizens look at 
candidates’ personal reputation rather than their party label in open-list electoral systems 
(Carey and Shugart 1995, 418; Gouglas et al. 2018, 11). Future research will not only have to 
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examine party’s candidate selection criteria but also whether the shift from a closed- to an 
open-list system has shaped party leaders’ strategy with regard to incumbent de-selection. 
Indonesia may turn out to be a case where the introduction of an open-list system for the sake 
of increasing accountability and a deepening of democracy has had the exact opposite effect, 
namely to discourage party leaders from de-selecting incumbents. In other words, since the 
introduction of an open-party list system, party leaders have played it safe by selecting more 
incumbents when putting together their respective party’s candidate lists.  
There is not only variance in non-electoral incumbent turnover across time but our 
research also showed that non-electoral incumbent turnover differed between parties in a 
given election year. The causes for this variance need to be examined in future research too. 
Some parties such as the PPP had consistently high non-electoral turnover rates across 
election years, while there were parties such as the PKS that have had low non-electoral 
turnover figures since 2004. 
Future research will have to identify the reasons for these differences across parties 
within a given election year. Arguably, the formative years of Indonesian parties play an 
important role in non-electoral incumbent turnover rates. For instance, the PPP was 
established after Suharto forced Islamic parties to merge into a single party in 1973. The 
amalgam of different interests began to show cracks immediately after the democratic 
opening in 1998. The PPP has been struggling to overcome infighting and party internal rifts 
ever since. The PPP’s high non-electoral turnover rates over the past election cycles may 
reflect these internal tensions. The PKS, in contrast, is the only party in Indonesia that grew 
out of a class-based social movement. Arguably, this is why the PKS is also one of the most 
consolidated parties with a strong internal power structure tilted in favour of the party 
leadership (Buehler 2013). The low non-electoral incumbent turnover may be the result of 
PKS’ comparatively consolidated party structures. In other words, the differences in non-
electoral turnover figures between parties may indicate that some parties are more 
consolidated than others. 
In short, the candidate selection process in general and incumbent deselection in 
particular deserve more attention in order to better understand the perpetuation and renewal 
of political elites in Indonesia. Such research will not only illuminate incumbent turnover in 
Indonesia but will contribute to debates on whether or not party leaders play an important 
gatekeeper function in the renewal and perpetuation of elites, a question that is currently 
being discussed in the broader literature on democratisation in young democracies (Chandra 
2016, 3). Recent research on incumbent turnover in Western Europe has identified the role 
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parties play in incumbent turnover as “the most fundamental question” to be addressed in 
future  studies (Gouglas et al. 2017, 21). 
A comparison of official party rules regarding the candidate selection process (Juklak 
- Petunjuk Pelaksanaan) is a logical first step in examining the role parties play in incumbent 
turnover in Indonesia. Between 2010 and 2014, we tried for months on end to obtain these 
Juklak from all major parties in Indonesia for all election cycles since 1999. This proved to 
be difficult as parties claimed that they no longer have copies of these rules or were outright 
hostile when asked to share these rules and regulations. After four years, we managed to 
obtain only a fraction of the candidate nomination rules needed for such a study.  
The difficulties we encountered when trying to gather these documents suggests that 
party leaders have no interest in a transparent nomination process. Arguably, this is because 
these official rules are frequently ignored and violated during backroom negotiations 
pertaining to candidate selection prior to elections. Our difficulties to obtain even the formal 
rules regulating this process nevertheless shows the importance of examining in more depth 
the role of party leaders in incumbent turnover in Indonesia. 
5.ii Incumbent turnover due to failure to get re-elected 
Finally, there are various questions regarding the role of the Indonesian electorate in 
incumbent turnover that need to be addressed in future research. First, existing scholarship 
has argued that electoral volatility may play an important role in incumbent turnover. The 
higher electoral volatility – that is “the net change within the electoral party system resulting 
from individual vote transfers” (Pedersen 1979, 1475) – the higher the chances that 
incumbents are voted out of office due to partisan defeat (Heinsohn and Freitag 2012, 364).  
The impact of electoral volatility on incumbent turnover interacts with the type of 
electoral system as well as district magnitude. Electoral volatility is more likely to increase 
incumbent turnover in single-member district (SMD) systems than in proportional 
representation systems (PR). Furthermore, electoral volatility is more of a threat to 
incumbents in political systems with low electoral district magnitudes than in systems with 
high electoral district magnitudes (Matland and Studlar 2004, 95). At first sight, this does not 
seem to play much of a role in Indonesia’s incumbent turnover. In Indonesia, electoral 
volatility has remained fairly stable since the first election was held in 1999, as shown in 
Table 3. It is therefore unlikely to play much of a role in overall incumbent turnover rates.16 
Likewise, district magnitudes have also remained relatively stable throughout the years, 
despite lobbying efforts from larger parties to reduce the size of districts (O’Rourke 2012, 2). 
However, future research will have to examine whether electoral volatility at the party level 
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has had an impact on incumbent turnover. In other words, have parties that lost a lot of votes 
from one election cycle to another also lost a lot of incumbents, or did incumbents survive 
such “vote transfers” from one party to another relatively unscathed?  
Future research will also have to compare the role of voters with regard to incumbent 
turnover rates across the different electoral systems that Indonesia has had in place since 
1999. Incumbent turnover through intrapartisan defeat is more likely in PR systems that rely 
on open party list systems than in PR systems that are based on closed-party list systems 
(Matland and Studlar 2004, 93).17 Open party list systems of the kind introduced in Indonesia 
in 2009 are said to increase intraparty competition. Open party list systems force candidates 
to campaign against co-partisans and members from other parties because only the number of 
preference votes, not party list rank, decides whether or not a candidate will receive a seat in 
parliament. 
Our data presented in Table 1 showed that there is no such trend in Indonesia. In fact, 
the percentage of incumbents who failed to get re-elected due to partisan defeat has steadily 
increased over the years. There has been an increase in incumbent turnover through partisan 
defeat and a decline in incumbent turnover through intrapartisan defeat, despite the shift to an 
open-list PR electoral system. 
 There may be several reasons why partisan defeat has replaced intrapartisan defeat as 
the main reason for electoral incumbent turnover, despite the shift from a closed list party 
system to an open party list system. One, party labels continue to matter in Indonesia, even in 
an open party list system. Since candidates cannot self-nominate under Indonesian election 
rules, party leaders nominate candidates. In addition, party votes matter for the overall seat 
allocation. There are therefore incentives for incumbents and newcomers alike to compete 
under the same party label. Two, despite a switch from a closed party list system to an open 
party list system, Indonesian voters rarely disturb party lists. In the 2004 elections, 98.6% of 
all elected candidates had been listed on one of the top three party list ranks.18 In the 2009 
elections, the first under an open party list system, 90.4 % of all candidates who won a seat in 
parliament came from one of the top three party list ranks. In 2014, 83.6% of all successful 
candidates came from the top three party list ranks. In other words, while Indonesian voters 
have begun to disturb party lists and vote for a growing number of candidates ranked fourth 
or lower on party lists, the overwhelming majority of votes continue to be cast for candidates 
at the very top of party lists, as shown in Table 4. 
These figures suggest that Indonesian voters rather vote for a top ranked candidate 
from another party than a lower ranked candidate from the same party. This may explain why 
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partisan defeat has replaced intrapartisan defeat as the main reason for electoral incumbent 
turnover.  However, voter behaviour seems also rather complex with regard to top three 
ranked candidates. Comparing the 2009 and 2004 elections, we found that after Indonesia 
switched to an open party list system in 2009, incumbents attracted more preference votes 
than non-incumbents, but only if they were first or third ranked on party lists. Comparing the 
2014 and 2009 elections, we found that list disturbance became more pronounced. Fewer 
voters supported top three ranked candidates. However, we also found that incumbents 
ranked second on party lists accumulated more preference votes in 2014 than in 2009. 
Finally, comparing the 2014 and the 2004 elections, we found that voters disturbed party lists 
to a higher degree in 2014 than in 2004. However, in 2014 voters did not pull away from first 
and second ranked candidates if they were incumbents.  
 The higher levels of preference votes and a shift of preference votes away from 
candidates ranked at the top of party lists we detected is in line with the literature on the 
effects of open party list systems on voter behaviour. Open party list systems are said to 
encourage preference votes and list disturbance. However, our findings also suggest that 
these effects are sometimes neutralized by incumbency. As shown above in Table 4, the 
majority of candidates elected into parliament were from the top three ranks on party lists. 
Future research will have to examine why voters continue to vote for top ranked candidates 
despite the fact that the electoral system adopted in 2009 would actually allow them to vote 
for lower ranked candidates. In other words, the decline in incumbent turnover rates due to 
co-partisan defeat is not in line with turnover rates in other countries that switched from a 
closed-list to an open-list system. Future research therefore needs to examine how in 
Indonesia incumbency mitigates the impact of dynamics usually associated with open-list 
systems.  
The picture is complicated by the fact that a potential interaction effect between 
incumbency and party list rank is not stable across ranks and election years, as shown above. 
In light of these findings, future research on incumbent turnover in Indonesia should 
investigate further why there is an interaction effect between incumbency and party list rank 
for certain list ranks in certain election years. Is it a positive track-record, face recognition, 
proximity to party leaders, or a combination of these that allow top ranked newcomers to 
profit from their list ranking compared to newcomers with the same party list ranks? 
Likewise, future research will have to address why top ranked incumbents lost in certain 
years while they attracted more votes than lower ranked incumbents in other years. Were 
voters content with the politics and policymaking of incumbents listed at the top of party lists 
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in 2009 but not in 2014? Did party leaders support third ranked incumbents but not second 
ranked incumbents in 2009?  
 
Consequences of high incumbent turnover  
While this article has mainly identified research questions regarding the causes of incumbent 
turnover, future research will also have to examine the consequences of Indonesia’s high 
incumbency turnover rates. This is especially important with regard to the quality of 
democracy and policymaking. Total incumbent turnover, consisting of non-electoral and 
electoral turnover rates, was 69.9% in 2004, 72.2% in 2009 and 58% in 2014. In other words, 
total incumbent turnover figures have remained extraordinarily high in Indonesia over the 
past 20 years.  
Indonesia’s high total incumbent turnover rates are usually talked about in positive 
terms as they are understood as indicators for the dynamism and vibrancy of Indonesia’s 
democratisation process (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, 586; Case 2015, 259). However, it is far 
from clear whether the country’s high incumbent turnover rates are a reason for optimism. 
The existing literature on incumbent turnover rates in consolidated democracies warns of 
both too high and too low incumbent turnover rates.  
If incumbent turnover rates are too high, the quality of lawmaking may suffer because 
of a lack of experience and institutional knowledge among lawmakers (Luce 1924, 358) High 
turnover rates, in other words, may “preclude consistent, thoughtful decision making” 
(Moncrief et al. 2004, 357).  In addition, high turnover rates may also weaken the “watchdog 
functions” of parliaments (Rosenthal 1974, 609). 
While high incumbent turnover rates may weaken the quality of lawmaking and 
horizontal accountability (Bell and Price 1975; Miquel and Snyder 2006), low incumbent 
turnover rates are equally undesirable. If there is very little circulation of parliamentarians, 
there is a risk that a class of professional politicians emerges that increasingly rules in its own 
interest rather than that of the public. Low incumbent turnover rates, in other words, may 
undermine accountability too. Furthermore, a parliament in which only few members are 
replaced from one election to another also prevents new political groups from entering formal 
politics. This may lead to growing frustration among the electorate and a loss of legitimacy 
for the national assembly.19  
The existing literature mentions an incumbent turnover rate of 20–30% from one 
election to another as ideal for the functioning of a parliament and the consolidation of 
democracy (Best 2008, 101; Blondel 1973, 85; Cotta and Best 2000, 505, Crowther and 
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Matonyte 2007, 291).  While Indonesia’s extremely high turnover rates certainly suggest a re-
examination of the argument that oligarchs and entrenched elites dominate Indonesian 
politics (Winters 2011; Hadiz and Robison 2013), a more cautious assessment of the 
country’s high turnover rates are in order in light of our findings. Rather than a sign for a 
healthy replacement of old elites with newcomers, Indonesia’s high turnover may be an 
important explanation for the low productivity, weak oversight function and abysmal quality 
of lawmaking the Indonesian parliament has been criticized for (Adiputri 2015; Ziegenhain 
2008b, 169). In other words, the weak law-making capacity of Indonesia’s parliament may be 
a consequence of a lack of experience and poor institutional memory as a result of high 
incumbent turnover rates.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has provided the first systematic account of incumbent turnover in Indonesia 
since 1999, and has identified various avenues for future research. While we here examined 
incumbent turnover at the party level, most of the avenues for future research identified 
above can only be addressed by studying incumbent turnover at the individual level. 
Concretely, the backgrounds of successful and unsuccessful incumbents on the ballot list 
need to be compared to answer such questions. For instance, do deselected incumbents have 
similar political careers? Are incumbents wealthier than newcomers? Did successful 
incumbents stand out in the policymaking process by suggesting innovative laws or populist 
agendas? Do incumbents who are voted out share a similar socio-economic background? 
Sebastian Dettman, Thomas B. Pepinsky and Jan H. Pierskalla’s 2017 contribution is an 
important step towards studying incumbent turnover at the candidate level. However, more 
research needs to be conducted on candidate characteristics such as socio-economic 
background, links to the New Order dictatorship and political dynasties in order to obtain a 
better sense if, and if so how, incumbent turnover contributes to elite renewal in the world’s 
third largest democracy. Most importantly, future research will have to differentiate between 
newcomers and re-entering MPs to gain a better understanding of elite renewal and not only 
elite circulation in the world’s largest democracy. 
A close examination of the biographies and socio-economic background of 
incumbents and newcomers is also necessary since the circulation of elites and the 
composition of elites are not the same as mentioned before. It may well be the case that 
incumbents are replaced by figures of similar background and socio-economic standing rather 
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than by genuinely “new” interest groups or classes. The oligarchy thesis that stresses elite 
continuity above all, would then still hold, despite Indonesia’s high incumbent turnover rates. 
In other words, if MPs are merely recycled, rather than renewed, arguably Indonesia’s 
political system is then more stable than the high incumbency turnover rates would suggest. 
On the other hand, if high incumbent turnover rates also mean high newcomer rates, 
Indonesia is then more democratic than accounts of oligarchic tendencies in Indonesian 
politics imply. 
Furthermore, our study also showed the necessity for more studies on incumbent 
turnover in new democracies in general. Most new democracies are characterized by weakly 
institutionalized political parties, volatile party systems, relatively high levels of party 
switching by candidates, money politics and vote-buying instead of programmatic political 
agendas, as well as endemic and systemic corruption. Our paper has hinted at how these 
characteristics may lead to incumbent turnover dynamics very different from the consolidated 
democracies in North America and Western Europe, the subject of most research on 
incumbent turnover.  
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Figure 1: Causes of Incumbent Turnover Matrix 
 Supply-side causes Demand-side causes 
Non-electoral causes - Death 
- Forced resignation  
- Voluntary exit 
- De-selection by party 














2004 0 7 1 
2009 12 12 3 
2014 2 6 2 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on National Electoral Commission data 
 
Table 3: Electoral Volatility in Indonesia since 1999 
Electoral volatility 
between… 
2004 and 1999 2009 and 2004 2014 and 2009 
 29% 30% 27% 
Source: authors’ calculation based on National Electoral Commission data 
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lower 1 2 3
4 and 
lower 1 2 3
4 and 
lower
PAN 52 1 0 0 53 31 6 4 5 46 33 10 1 5 49
98.1% 1.9% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 67.4% 13.0% 8.7% 10.9% 100.0% 67.3% 20.4% 2.0% 10.2% 100.0%
Demokrat 52 3 1 0 56 70 38 21 19 148 28 13 6 14 61
92.9% 5.4% 1.8% 0.0% 100.0% 47.3% 25.7% 14.2% 12.8% 100.0% 45.9% 21.3% 9.8% 23.0% 100.0%
Gerindra 25 0 0 0 25 48 9 1 15 73
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 65.8% 12.3% 1.4% 20.5% 100.0%
Golkar 69 42 11 5 127 62 23 4 17 106 50 21 3 17 91
54.3% 33.1% 8.7% 3.9% 100.0% 58.5% 21.7% 3.8% 16.0% 100.0% 54.9% 23.1% 3.3% 18.7% 100.0%
Hanura 18 0 0 0 18 7 4 1 4 16
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 43.8% 25.0% 6.3% 25.0% 100.0%
PKS 38 5 2 0 45 52 3 0 2 57 32 4 1 3 40
84.4% 11.1% 4.4% 0.0% 100.0% 91.2% 5.3% 0.0% 3.5% 100.0% 80.0% 10.0% 2.5% 7.5% 100.0%
PKB 29 13 8 2 52 18 5 4 1 28 33 8 2 4 47
55.8% 25.0% 15.4% 3.8% 100.0% 64.3% 17.9% 14.3% 3.6% 100.0% 70.2% 17.0% 4.3% 8.5% 100.0%
NasDem 28 4 0 3 35
80.0% 11.4% 0.0% 8.6% 100.0%
PPP 28 7 0 3 38 30 4 2 3 39
73.7% 18.4% 0.0% 7.9% 100.0% 76.9% 10.3% 5.1% 7.7% 100.0%
PDIP 63 33 11 2 109 54 26 7 7 94 59 18 8 24 109
57.8% 30.3% 10.1% 1.8% 100.0% 57.4% 27.7% 7.4% 7.4% 100.0% 54.1% 16.5% 7.3% 22.0% 100.0%
PNI MM 1 0 0 0 1
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PPDI 1 0 0 0 1
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PPDK 4 0 0 0 4
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PPKB 2 0 0 0 2
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PPP 52 6 0 0 58
89.7% 10.3% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
P-Pelopor 3 0 0 0 3
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PBB 11 0 0 0 11
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PBR 14 0 0 0 14
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PDS 13 0 0 0 13
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
PKPI 1 0 0 0 1
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Total 405 103 33 9 550 358 108 40 54 560 348 95 25 92 560
73.6% 18.7% 6.0% 1.6% 100.0% 63.9% 19.3% 7.1% 9.6% 100.0% 62.1% 17.0% 4.5% 16.4% 100.0%




                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 Occasionally, party leaders successfully circumvented this rule. Eventually, 92 of a total of 462 MPs in the 
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14 In 2009, many voters were confused because they remembered that they had been allowed to tick two boxes 
in 2004. This confusion apparently accounted for 14% invalid votes in the 2009 elections. We thank Marcus 
Mietzner for pointing this out. 
15 Our data on this issue is incomplete. However, prior to the 2004 elections, only three incumbents died in 
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16 Electoral volatility explains incumbent turnover rates at the party level when compared across election cycles 
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17 Similarly, single transferable vote systems (STV) show higher turnover due to intrapartisan defeat than single 
non-transferable vote (SNTV) systems (Matland and Studlar 2004, 93). 
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party list rank. 
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